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Abstract
Using a remarkable matched employer-employee dataset, this thesis investigates how wage
dispersion evolved in Portugal and whose components contributed more to this variation,
highlighting the impact of peer effects in both individual wages and wage inequality. A re-
gression model with high dimensional fixed effects is used. The results show that, contrary
to the case of Germany, wage dispersion in Portugal has decreased over the last decade.
Person effects are the main contributors, with its contribution rising over time, contrasting
with the declining role of firm effects. The role of peer effects in wage dispersion ranges
between 4.2% and 6.6%, with a one standard deviation increase impacting on individual
wages with that same magnitude.
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1 Introduction
Firm heterogeneity has been found to play an important role in explaining wage dispersion.
Consequently, shedding light on how one important intrinsic characteristic of firms, the quality
of their workforce, is pertinent departing, at the same time, from the usual attribution of variation
to different wage posting and/or wage bargaining policies. Indeed, Battisti (2013) found that
the quality of the co-workers of an individual worker contributes to wage dispersion while,
simultaneously, reducing the contribution of the firm component.
On the other hand, as stressed in Cornelissen, Dustmann, and Schönberg (2013), the existence
of peer effects may lead firm productivity to outstrip the aggregation of individual workers’
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productivities by virtue of an improved performance of a worker after his interaction with a
more productive co-worker. Hence, this consists on a reason for the existence of firms. If peer
effects are negligible, this reason will not be in force. Therefore, and in accordance with Bloom
et al. (2015), people could be more productive when working from home than when they work
in a physical establishment, interacting with their peers.
This thesis intends to unravel the extent to which peer effects are relevant in the Portuguese labor
market and whether they influence wage dispersion, the latter inserted in the broader picture of
figuring out which components contribute more to wage inequality. It aims to provide new
insights on wage inequality in Portugal, since most of the research done up to this point only
covers the period until the end of the XX century.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized in the following way: section 2 consists on
an overview of the literature related with this study; section 3 gives a brief synopsis of past
research on wage dispersion in Portugal; sections 4 and 5 lay out the empirical methodology of
the research and the characteristics of the data, respectively; section 6 provides the key findings
on the role of peer effects and its impact on inequality, while section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Wage inequality has received consideration due to its increase in many countries. Previous
studies have identified demand-side (technological change and alterations in the trade pattern
resulting from amore integrated world economy) and supply-side (increase in the relative supply
of high-education workers) explanations, along with labour market institutional changes (the re-
duction of union density or the evolution of minimumwage legislation) as possible explanations
for this trend, as stressed in Dunne et al. (2000) and Faggio, Salvanes, and Reenen (2007).
Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) address the observable increase of wage inequality in West
Germany through a different approach. They decompose wage variation into a worker-specific
and an employer-specific components. The rationale behind this is the existence of firm specific
wage premiums, in which equally skilled workers receive higher wages in some firms. To put
it differently, there is a distinction between the rising variation originated from individuals’
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portable skills and the one from firms’ pay premiums that impact wage inequality. They find
that the exacerbation of wage inequality was driven by an increasing dispersion of the worker-
specific component of pay, along with the employer-specific component and an increase of their
covariance, indicating an increment of positive assortative matching.
The pervasiveness of firm specific wage premiums in the labour market leads to an unmistakable
relevance of the study of its impact on wage differentials, notably concentrating on the effect
of employer characteristics on wages. Groshen (1991) reported their importance using US data
for intra-industry wage differentials whereas Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016) demonstrate their
importance for the gender wage gap using Portuguese data. Rent-sharing, strategic wage posting
behaviour, efficiency wage premiums and compensating differentials are explanations given to
the existence of firm specific wage premiums. Card et al. (2016) look at the firm switching
literature (which propounds that gains or losses in wages due to workers changing firms can be
anticipated) and reconciled it with rent-sharing estimates obtained through the study of how firm
productivity impacts workers’ wages. Hence, it is possible to connect rent-sharing elasticities
with wage inequality. As a matter of fact, if we observe either increasing differences on produc-
tivity or rising differences in the share of rents that employees obtain at diverse workplaces, then
we are able to explain part of the increase in wage inequality. Alternatively, one could focus on
models of imperfect competition of the labour market, taking into account the market power of
firms arising from the different valuations that workers’ exhibit of job amenities. Under those
circumstances, search frictions are not necessary for firms to have some monopsony power in
setting wages. Furthermore, Van Reenen (1996) studies quasi-rents’ sharing arisen from break-
through innovations, where he finds that although technological change increases average firm
wages, it does not seem to influence the shape of the wage structure. Notwithstanding this result,
it does not exclude the possibility of technological diffusion having an effect on wage inequal-
ity, through, for instance, the increase of demand for high skilled workers to face the spread
of new technologies, as predicted by the skill-biased technical change argument in Davis and
Haltiwanger (1991).
In this framework, Battisti (2013) found, for the region of Veneto in Italy, that the inclusion of
spillover effects of the characteristics of co-workers on a variance decomposition of the wage
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of an individual leads to a decline on the part of wage variation explained by firm effects. Ac-
cordingly, the composition of a firm’s workforce seems to be a prominent component of the
effect that firms’ characteristics have on wages. On that account, it is pertinent to determine
the extent to which employees’ quality drives firm heterogeneity. This reasoning derives from
the possible existence of technological spillovers, which refer to the productivity-enhancing ex-
change of knowledge accruing from interactions among employees. The conceivable increment
of spillovers is of concern to the enlargement of wage inequality, as it could result in increasing
productivity differences among firms. As a matter of fact, Cornelissen, Dustmann, and Schön-
berg (2013) stress that the existence of peer effects may give rise to a larger long-term inequality
if high skilled workers gather in the same peer groups.
Although peer effects are originally considered in an education setting, evidence on their exis-
tence at the workplace began with studies on specific occupations, which take the form of real
data on a single firm or occupation (for example, Mas and Moretti (2009) focus on the existing
peer effect in a supermarket chain, providing evidence on the prevalence of peer pressure) or of a
laboratory experiment. In light of the need to determine whether extrapolation of these findings
to the labor market as a whole is possible, Cornelissen, Dustmann, and Schönberg (2013) focus
on this issue while considering the impact peer effects have on wages instead of on productivity.
The authors identify “peer pressure” as one way through which the productivity of one worker is
enhanced by another, since falling short of what a peer has achieved may trigger a larger effort
from the part of the worker. On the other hand, there may exist “knowledge spillovers” whereby
communication among workers leads to the development or improvement of skills that would
not occur otherwise.1 These factors entail that workers have a higher productivity when their
co-workers’ productivity is high.
In contrast to these arguments, Mas andMoretti (2009) enunciate the case where co-workersmay
engage in free-riding if the output of each worker is not completely observable, which turns out
to be burdensome if the employer wants to reward high effort. Moreover, as suggested in Kremer
(1993), if different workers have a different amount of human capital, a “skills incompatibility”
1An example, for the Portuguese case, is Martins and Jin (2010) that develop a learning model in which an
individual worker learns from the schooling of his co-workers. On the other hand, Lindquist, Sauermann,
and Zenou (2015) provide evidence that there are strategic complementarities (knowledge spillovers) between
trained workers and non-trained co-workers in a call center of a mobile network operator.
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problem may arise, implying that firms with a uniform labor force in terms of human capital
will have a higher productivity.
Setting his sights on determining how the quality of a worker’s peers impact his wage, Battisti
(2013) identifies, besides the presence of peer pressure, the existence of complementarities in the
production function of each individual to be one of the reasons why the degree of skills of a co-
worker matter for his wage, since the marginal productivity of each person will depend on peer
quality. Furthermore, the wage of a worker may be influenced by his reservation wage, which, in
turn, might depend on the groups of co-workers. To put it differently, an individual may accept
a lower wage when he has the opportunity to work alongside a peer group that he prefers. This
is a compensating differential rationale, entailing a wage reduction since an amenity – working
with preferred co-workers – exists. It is not possible to disentangle whether, in this context, the
spillover effect is positive or negative. Lastly, bargaining externalities are a factor to consider in
this setting. In case bargaining outcomes are positively correlated in a workplace, the extraction
of higher shares of surplus by high quality individuals will bring about an increase in wages
of peers. Therefore, having high skilled peers will increment a worker’s wage. However, if
wages are a fixed share of revenues and some groups comprise a larger bargaining power than
the remaining, this effect may be negative.
In this thesis I will explore the role of firm specific characteristics on wage inequality, with a
particular focus on peer effects in the Portuguese labour market. Previous studies have reported
that firms play a role in wage determination, albeit the paramount role of worker characteristics.
The primordial objective is to investigate the substantiality of firm’s heterogeneity in explaining
wage inequality. Additionally, this study will be focusing on productivity as a contributor to
firms’ wage premiums, relating it with peer effects. There has been a renewed interest in the
literature for the impact of co-workers’ characteristics in the context of the labour market. On
the other hand, to my knowledge, there isn’t a straightforward association of peer effects and
wage inequality using Portuguese data, in spite of their likely repercussion on productivity. The
availability of a remarkable employer-employee dataset enables the observation of the popu-
lation of firms and workers in the manufacturing and services private sector, empowering our
estimates and allowing us to examine time variations in the composition of firms and workers.
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3 Wage Inequality in Portugal
Most existing studies on wage inequality in Portugal concern the late 80’s and early 90’s. In
Cardoso (1997), Cardoso (1998) and Cardoso (1999), wage inequality in Portugal is the topic
under study. Having as a benchmark the period between 1983 and 1992, it is observed that
inequality in the labour market verified an upward trend. This growth was mainly due to an
increasingly stretched upper half of the wage distribution. The share of inequality originating
from worker characteristics was found to increase, mainly due to a sharp increment of returns
to schooling in high-paying firms. Furthermore, rising inequality was found to be generated by
changes in the employment structure, through the rise in the demand for more qualified workers
taking place within industries. Nevertheless, firms seemed to be valuing less labour market
experience and age, as progression mechanisms based on seniority diminished from 1983 to
1992. Modernization of the economy is usually appointed as the driving force stimulating the
upgrade of the quality of employees, which is accompanied by the observed increase in the
returns to education. On balance, inequality in the aforementioned period derives from high
wages being very high when compared to the remaining distribution. The Portuguese wage
distribution was, therefore, characterized by a compressed bottom and a stretched top. The fact
that education returns are higher for highly paid jobs, impacting positively on wage dispersion,
is also verified in Machado and Mata (2001).2 These authors find tenure to have more influence
at lower paid jobs, larger firms to pay more to all workers and that firms with foreign capital
increase wages more to those in higher paid jobs.
In Cardoso (2004), the Portuguese case is contrasted with the one of the UK: while in the latter
wage inequality verified an uninterrupted positive trend, in the former there seems to be a turning
point as inequality is found to be decreasing in the period 1994-1999. There is a relatively small
body of literature that analyses a more recent period.
Provided that wage dispersion has not been extensively studied for the Portuguese case, it is
relevant to disentangle the contribution that worker, firm and peer components have been having
2They verify that the tendency sharpens between 1982 and 1994. Hence, the rising returns to education coincide
with an increase in workers’ average level of schooling, which entails that there has simultaneously been a shift
in the demand for more skilled workers, whichmay reflect technological improvements. This is also highlighted
in Pereira and Martins (2000), along with the finding that dispersion is heightened with the level of education.
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in shaping it, while simultaneously comparing the results to what has been witnessed in other
countries.
4 Empirical Framework
4.1 Baseline wage regression and inclusion of spillovers
The methodological approach used in this study rests on the econometric framework developed
by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013), which intents on unravelling the extent to which individual-
specific or firm-specific characteristics impact on wage dispersion. Under those circumstances,
we are going to rely on the following equation, which is designated as the AKMmodel, specified
in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1994):
yit = αi + θJ(i,t) + x
′
itβ + ϵit , (1)
where y
it
is the logarithm of the real hourly wage for worker i at year t; x′it consists on a vector
of observed time-varying characteristics of workers along with a set of year dummies;3 αi is a
time-invariant worker fixed effect, meaning it encompasses worker-specific characteristics that
are rewarded equally by firms; θJ(i,t) is a time-invariant establishment fixed effect, consisting
on the proportional pay premium given by firm j to all workers; and ϵit is the disturbance term
of the regression, which follows the conventional assumptions (zero mean, strict exogeneity).
An objective of this study is to investigate how the wage structure has changed over the course
of the years. With this intention, intervals of seven years will be considered. In each of these
intervals separate linear models will be fitted, as done in Card, Heining, and Kline (2013). This
procedure entails the usage of high-dimensional fixed effects, whereby estimation by the usual
OLS formula is hindered, since the dimension of the matrices for the fixed effects render it un-
feasible to use the formerly specified formula. Acknowledging this limitation, we resort to an
3In our case, it includes the following observed time varying characteristics of employees: age, age squared,
tenure and tenure squared.
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algorithm developed by Guimarães and Portugal (2010) to circumvent the problem.4 Conse-






yit − αi − θJ(i,t) − x
′
itβ
]2. One point that should
not be overlooked concerns the identification of the worker and firm fixed effects. Thereupon,
identification is achieved by considering the largest connected set of observations. In other
words, firms are linked by worker mobility, so that as workers move from firm to firm, we are
able to disentangle the fixed effect of that firm, enabling us to further determine the worker fixed
effect because, after knowing and accounting for the one correspondent to the firm, the remain-
ing differences in pay would result from worker-specific characteristics. Henceforth, there is
the widespread need of relying on a connected set to have identifiable employer and employee
fixed effects.5
On the other hand, departing from the research in which our base model hinges on, we will focus
on the contribution of co-workers’ characteristics towards the wage of an individual. Accord-
ingly, we resort to Arcidiacono et al. (2012) by constructing a spillover effect consisting on the
linear combination of individual fixed effects. Hence, the model to be estimated is:
yit = αi + θJ(i,t) + x
′
itβ + γα−i + ϵit, (2)
where α−i = 1Nijt∼i
∑
k∈Nijt∼i
αk is the mean of the person fixed effects of the co-workers of
worker i (is gauged without including worker i) and γ is its coefficient (the impact that the peer
effect has on the logarithm of an individual i’s real hourly wage).6 In this setting, the co-workers
of worker i are all workers that, in a given year, are in the same firm as i.7 There is the need to
4This consists on an iterative gradient algorithm. In the context of Y = A1α + A2θ + Bβ + ϵ, we obtain the
following matrix:







We are able to solve it by alternating between the estimation of β and α and θ , without having to worry about
the dimensionality of A1and A2, avoiding inversion of large matrixes by estimating β first and then adding the
fixed effect components as additional covariates. The estimation procedure converges, attributing the value of 1
to the coefficients ofA1α andA2θ. Therefore, the estimation is done on a first stage by giving starting values for
α′s and θ′s and, conditional on them, estimating the coefficients of the explanatory variables; subsequently, we
take the former values as given and re-estimate α′s and θ′s; this process goes on until convergence is achieved.
This is possible by virtue of the decline of the sum of squared errors in each step, enabling the minimization of
the least squares problem independently of the starting values given.
5The stata command group3hd was used for this purpose.
6k is a co-worker of i
7In this study, we consider the case defined as “static” by Arcidiacono et al. (2012), which propounds ability of a
worker to be fixed over time, being an individual’s wage, in our case, a function of its person fixed effect along
with the mean of the person fixed effects of the co-workers of its peer group.
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outline that this variable will be identified even in regressions that include a worker fixed effect
because the aforementioned variable takes different values across the time span in study due to
changes in the composition of the group of co-workers over time.
The main assumption underlying this procedure is proportionality which states that, as defined
in Arcidiacono et al. (2012), the relative role that each of the components of the characteristics
of an individual has on directly impacting an individual’s wage is the same in the case of the peer
effect.8 Analogously, a prerequisite that the residuals of any two observations are not correlated
exists, so that identification is possible, enabling the obtainment of a consistent estimate of γ.
Accordingly, unobservables varying over time that influence changes in the composition of the
peer group of a worker can’t exist if, concurrently, those unobservables also impact on that














yit − αi − θJ(i,t) − x
′
itβ − γα−i
]2, by applying an algorithm similar to the
formerly described in the case without acknowledgement of spillovers, where we can estimate
individual and peer group fixed effects at the same time.9 In fact, workers within a firm usually
have similar wages by virtue of having similar characteristics and working on the same environ-
ment, resulting in an overestimation of the peer effect. Hence, this spillover shall be computed
by changes in the composition of the peer group, implying that we need panel data. In essence,
variations in the quality of the peer group due to co-workers joining and leaving the firm is ex-
ploited, along with changes in the quality of the peer group of a worker deriving from the fact
that he moved to another firmwhich has a different workforce. The possibility that the exclusion
of co-workers’ attributes due to their unobservability might underestimate the repercussions the
peer effect has on individual wages is circumvented by the usage of the average of the fixed
effects of the co-workers.
In the context of equation (2), some problems need to be surmounted. Among them is the
reflection problem which, as stressed by Manski (1993), Sacerdote (2001) and Angrist (2014),
derives from the mutual impact that an individual and his peer have on each other, hampering the
8Under these conditions, Theorem 1 of Arcidiacono et al. (2012) can be used, so that consistency and asymptotic
normality of γ̂ can be derived.
9 The spillover effect is identifiable if peer groups comprise variations in size.
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disentanglement of the effect that a peer has on the outcome of a worker. This is circumvented
by considering the average fixed effect of the co-workers instead of their wages or effort. In
addition, alertness regarding the incidental parameters problem (in which biased estimates of
γ stem from the estimation of individual unobserved heterogeneity when we have a non-linear
panel data model) should be present. Nevertheless, due to the aforementioned assumptions
imposed by Arcidiacono et al. (2012), fixed effects estimators will not be inconsistent in this
setting, as the necessary mechanisms to consistently estimate γ are present.
Furthermore, endogenous sorting needs to be accounted for. In light of this necessity, Cornelis-
sen, Dustmann, and Schönberg (2013) outline that the inclusion of worker fixed effects enables
the accountability of any prevailing sorting of high ability individuals into highly skilled peer
groups. Furthermore, the addition of firm fixed effects allows any sorting of high ability em-
ployees into high-wage firms to be taken into consideration. Hence, a spurious correlation be-
tween a worker’s wage and the peer quality of the group he his inserted in is avoided. Lastly,
the incorporation of year dummies in the model facilitates the acknowledgement of the chance
that employers attract high ability workers while simultaneously increasing wages, considering
shocks idiosyncratic to a firm.
All things considered, one could envisage that the peer group in this study, by including all
workers in the firm, is rather large, as usually workers interactionswith all their co-workers differ
in size. Notwithstanding, Cornelissen, Dustmann, and Schönberg (2013) show that including
irrelevant workers, by virtue of little interaction happening between them, is not a source of bias
of γ if individuals randomly choose with whom they interact, whereas not including relevant
peers is found to cause a downward bias in γ̂.
Determining whether the measure of the peer effect implemented in this study is the most ade-
quate could be an interesting addition by future research, through, for instance, the attribution
of different weights to individuals that are more alike the specific worker and those who aren’t
or by giving a larger weight to workers in the same occupation who likely interact more with
each other. Furthermore, the prospect that high skilled co-workers may impact wages more than
lower quality peers, having a dissimilar impact on wage dispersion, could also be investigated.
As an illustration, (Cornelissen, Dustmann, and Schönberg 2013) divide each group in the top
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10%, middle 80% and bottom 10% workers. This possibility, alongside testing the chance that
improvements in group quality may influence the wage of an individual in a different manner
than a reduction, are further developments that can be carried out.
Another potential complication is the requirement that wages are flexible to a certain extent,
reacting to variations in the quality of the peer group, lest γ is not able to be properly identified.
Specifically, firms should pay differently to workers that have dissimilar individual productiv-
ities even if their observable characteristics are the same. Failing to have this characteristic in
the data would render it impossible to unravel any spillover effect on wages. Nonetheless, one
of the advantages of considering the peer group to comprise all the co-workers is the increased
likelihood of having wage flexibility, whereas focusing only on peers with the same occupation
could be troublesome in this sense.10
Finally, the conclusions will be augmented by considering the same specification but allowing
for the existence of time varying firm effects, meaning that there is a separate firm effect for each
year it appears in the data. Lengermann (2002) pinpoints themain advantage of this specification
which is the overpowering of the issue of omitted variables (the possible covariance between
the peer effect and time varying firm effects isn’t a problem in this situation).
4.2 Variance Decomposition
As stated above, this study’s main objective is to discern what is the impact that each of the
components defined above have on wage dispersion. In pursuance of this, the time period en-
compassed by the dataset used (between 1986 and 2013) is divided into seven-year intervals
where separate models as defined in (2) are fit. Subsequently, the estimates of the parameters
of interest are comparable, enabling us to decompose any changes in the structure of wages in
the following way:
V ar(yit) = V ar(αi)+V ar(θJ(i,t))+V ar(x
′
itβ)+γ







itβ, α−i)+V ar(ϵit) , (3)
10As mentioned in Dickens et al. (2007), Portugal is known for having downward nominal wage rigidity. In this
sense, the later period of our data (ranging from 2007 to 2013) may be characterized by lower wage flexibility
since inflation in this period has been low, which, along with nominal wage rigidities, does not allow large
variations of real wages.
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Alternatively, one could consider the following decomposition:
V ar(yit) = Cov(yit, yit) = Cov(yit, αi + θJ(i,t) + βx
′
it + γα−i + ϵit) = Cov(yit, αi) +
Cov(yit, θJ(i,t)) + Cov(yit, x
′
itβ) + γCov(yit, α−i) + Cov(yit, ϵit)














In the latter decomposition, we are able to disentangle the share of importance that each com-
ponent has on the variance of real wages.
One shortcoming pinpointed by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) is the potential existence of
sampling errors in the estimated worker and firm fixed effects, giving rise to upward biases
on V ar(αi) and V ar(θJ(i,t)). In the same way, a downward bias in Cov(αi, θJ(i,t)) is likely to
materialize because of the formerly noticed sampling errors. In addition, due to the diminished
mobility of workers among firms in the division into intervals (since in each period less worker
movements are considered), the results obtained in each interval may have an additional source
of bias in these variables, as mentioned in Andrews et al. (2012). Despite these pitfalls, the
approach follows the one in this literature, overlooking them under the hypothesis that the biases
are analogous in all intervals considered, not translating into unfeasible comparisons.
4.3 Inclusion of a measure of productivity
Card et al. (2016) posit that firms have quite different values in measured productivity which
may spillover to the wages of workers. Concomitantly, it is relevant to look at how a measure
of productivity influences wage dispersion and how it will impact the share of inequality that is
explained by the firm effect.




where nw is the number of workers in the firm and cpi is the consumer price index.
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This measure, which is basically a sales per worker measure, has inherent problems in measur-
ing productivity deriving from not measuring labor quality, as identified in Card et al. (2016).
Nevertheless, the inclusion of a measure of the quality of the workforce through the average of
the fixed effects of the peers of a worker will lead these shortcomings to be attenuated. This
measure has, however, an extra complication when compared to value added per worker arising
from the proportion of intermediate inputs and services that are not produced by the firm but
purchased, implying that this is not a perfect measure of productivity, which should be taken
into account when interpreting the results.
Therefore, the model in this case is represented by the following equation:
yit = αi + θJ(i,t) + x
′
itβ + γα−i + λp+ ϵit, (6)
where λ is the the impact that sales per worker has on the logarithm of an individual i’s real
hourly wage.
5 Data Description
In this study, the dataset resorted to was Quadros de Pessoal (Personnel Records), which is a
matched employer-employee-job title dataset, annually recorded by the Portuguese Ministry of
Employment through a mandatory survey covering firms that have at least one wage earner. The
mentioned dataset encompasses observations of every wage earner in the period between 1986-
2013 (with the exception of 1990 and 2001), excluding employees of the Public Administration
and household servants.
Quadros de Pessoal comprises extensive information on employees’ features (for instance, age,
education, gender, work schedule, earnings, occupation and tenure) and firm’s characteristics
(such as size, sales, economic activity and location). In the furtherance of knowing more about
this dataset, see Cardoso, Guimarães, and Portugal (2012).
Furthermore, the aforementioned dataset evades some problems usually associated with panel
data such as panel attrition or measurement errors due to not only the compulsory character
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of the survey, but also because the provision of the information is done by the employer (the
reporting tends to be more inaccurate when given by the worker). Likewise, the need to obey
the requirements of being displayed in a public space at the firm and of its quality being verified
frequently by the Ministry of Employment leads to an improved truthfulness of the data.
Lastly, being a longitudinal dataset, by construction, enables employees to be tracked over the
years, along with matching them to the firm they are at, since each worker is identified through
a code based on their social security number, whilst each firm is also given a unique identifying
number.
In this study, the restrictions imposed on the dataset were the inclusion of only full time workers,
with ages comprised between 18 and 64 that had tenure inferior to 50 years. Additionally, wages
needed to be higher than 80% of the minimum wage. Individuals working in agriculture or
fishery industries were not included. Lastly, all firms included in the model have at least two
workers and the observations included belong to the largest connected set, as defined in the
previous section.
The time span of the dataset was divided in the following four periods of seven years: 1986-
1993; 1993-1999; 1999-2006 and 2007-2013. These comprise the following number of obser-
vations: 7560726, 9576699, 11332464 and 12160252, respectively . The additional restriction
of eliminating the observations that had a higher value than the 99 percentile of the measure
of productivity and a lower value than the 1 percentile of the mentioned variable was made in
the estimation of equation (6), in order to account for the existing outliers in this variable. This
constraint reduces the number of observations for each period to 6860216, 8672027, 10159088
and 11337389, respectively.
6 Empirical Results
The evolution of wage dispersion in Portugal is represented in Figure 1. The graph shows the
standard deviation of the logarithm of wages and the gap between the 80th and 20th percentiles,
the 80th and 50th percentiles and the 50th and 20th percentiles of this variable. The trends in
all measures are identical. While in the late 80’s and 90’s it is possible to observe an increase in
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dispersion, being the early 90’s the period where a larger growth rate of the standard deviation
was verified, whereas from the 00’s onwards the variation was negligible or even negative.11
In fact, most years in the beginning of that period registered a small increase contrasting with
the timespan of 2006 to 2011 where only 2009 saw an increase in the standard deviation of the
logarithm of real hourly wages.12Hence, this picture diverges markedly from the one observed
in Card, Heining, and Kline (2013), where these measures grow throughout the whole period.
Furthermore, while in the former the higher growth rates were observed until the early 1990’s,
in the latter these increased from the mid-90’s onwards.
Figure 1: Measures of Wage Dispersion
This figure includes the standard deviation of the logarithm of real hourly wages along with the gaps between the 80th and 50th percentiles,
the 80th and 20th percentiles and the 50th and 20th percentiles, which are normalized since these variables consist on the differences in
percentiles divided by the corresponding gaps of a normally distributed variable.
With this is mind, the estimation of equations (1) and (2) was performed and the corresponding
variance decomposition is presented in Table 1.
First of all, it is possible to confirm the recent decline in wage dispersion noticed in the graphical
analysis, with the variance of wages reaching a level in the last interval close to the one in the
initial interval. In the case without the peer effect, it can be seen that worker time-invariant
characteristics account for a large extent of the variance of wages, between 53% and 76% (in
fact, it is increasing over time). Heterogeneity of firms contributes between 31% and 17% (it is
11The exceptions are the years of 1995, 1996 and 1997, with the latter registering a quite pronounced decline (the
standard deviation declined 3.30% when compared to 1996).
12The highest decline in our sample was verified in 2008: the standard deviation of the logarithm of real hourly
wages declined 5.21% when compared to 2007.
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Model of Equation (1) Model of Equation (2)
Interval 1 Interval 2 Interval 3 Interval 4 Interval 1 Interval 2 Interval 3 Interval 4
(1986-1993) (1993-1999) (1999-2006) (2007-2013) (1986-1993) (1993-1999) (1999-2006) (2007-2013)
Var(yit) 0.306 0.346 0.340 0.311 0.306 0.346 0.340 0.311
Cov (yit, αi) 53.16% 62.60% 66.08% 76.06% 45.55% 49.54% 59.89% 68.49%
γCov (yit, α−i) 6.56% 5.09% 4.22% 5.34%
Cov (yit, θJ(i,t)) 30.63% 23.80% 24.14% 16.72% 31.22% 31.11% 25.38% 17.79%
Cov (yit, x
′
itβ) 7.31% 5.02% 2.73% 2.59% 7.90% 5.78% 3.51% 3.80%
Cov (yit, ϵit) 8.90% 8.58% 7.04% 4.63% 8.77% 8.48% 6.99% 4.59%
σ2(αi) 45.16% 55.46% 59.05% 69.67% 37.86% 42.88% 52.64% 61.07%
γ2σ2(α−i) 1.41% 0.91% 0.54% 0.74%
σ2(θJ(i,t)) 22.11% 17.11% 17.59% 11.25% 24.72% 26.41% 20.63% 14.59%
σ2(x
′
itβ) 5.17% 3.13% 1.58% 0.98% 5.58% 3.62% 2.12% 2.14%
2Cov(αi, θJ(i,t)) 14.37% 11.94% 12.43% 10.24% 7.07% 5.26% 7.06% 4.57%
2γCov (αi, α−i) 7.09% 6.43% 5.85% 8.14%
2γCov (θJ(i,t), α−i) 2.83% 1.68% 1.38% 0.84%
γ 0.364 0.259 0.171 0.171
R2 0.911 0.914 0.930 0.954 0.912 0.915 0.930 0.954
Sample Size 7560726 9576699 11332464 12160252 7560726 9576699 11332464 12160252
Table 1: Variance Decomposition of Equations (1) and (2)
Equation (1) corresponds to the specification without the peer effect whereas equation (2) includes that effect. This table presents the two
alternative variance decompositions proposed in equations (3) and (4). It also includes, in the context of the model of equation (2), the
estimated effect that the quality of peers has on a worker’s wage (γ).
decreasing over time). Taking into account the decomposition of equation (3), it is noticeable
that the person effects become more variable over time while the firm effects and the covariate
index (x′itβ) turn out to be less variable. Moreover, the role of the covariance between person
and firm effects has also a smaller role, ranging between 10% and 14%. Therefore, sorting of
high skilled workers into high wage firms (positive assortative matching) contributes to wage
dispersion. These results diverge from the ones presented by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013),
which is intuitive since their case is contrary to ours as inequality is increasing in Germany.
Secondly, if the case with peers is considered, gauging the impact of the quality of peers on
individual wages is possible: on average, a one standard deviation increase in the average of the
person effects of a worker’s peers (peer quality) results in an increase of hourly wages by 6.57%,
5.61%, 4.28% and 4.80% in intervals 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.13 Looking at the variance
decomposition, the contribution of the peer effect to wage dispersion ranges between 4.2% and
13This result is obtained by multiplying gamma with the standard deviation of the peer effect which takes the
following values from interval 1 to interval 4: 0.181, 0.217, 0.251 and 0.281 (see Table 3 in the appendix)
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6.6%. Even though this effect was declining between 1986 and 2006, it increased again in
the latest period. This observation may be twofold: there has been a decline in the number of
occupations where peer pressure and knowledge spillovers are mainly present and/or the rise
in qualifications people have when entering the labor market leads them no longer to acquire
that much knowledge from more experienced co-workers. Analogous to the conclusion in the
situationwithout the peer effect, person effects have the highest contribution, which is increasing
over time, while firm effects are also relevant but their contribution has been declining (this may
be the outcome of the rising representativeness of the minimum wage, that has been comprising
more and more workers and/or of collective bargaining). One interesting conclusion is that the
inclusion of the peer effect decreases the proportion of the wage variation that is explained by
the person effects and slightly increases the ones of the firm effect and the covariate index.14
In addition, accounting for the variance decomposition of equation (3), the same conclusions
hold for the variation of person effects and firm effects. Firstly, the increase in the variation of
the person effects over time may have been caused by the entrance in the labor market of high
skilled workers (with a higher person effect) concomitant with the permanence of less skilled
workers, which increases the dispersion of person effects. On the other hand, the decrease in
firm effects may arise due to smaller profits, which decreases the shared rents in firms that did
so. Moreover, the recent crisis may have led to a reduction of labor costs through a decline
in flexible wage components whose outcome would also be a decline in the variation of this
variable. On the other hand, firm effects are most of the times attributed to the existence of
market failures which are a source of labor market power.15 With the recent economic crisis,
less workers were available to move to another job because of the prominent need of job security
observed in those times. Consequently, immobility of workers increased, leading firms that did
not have or had little monopsony power to acquire it. This may have resulted in a lesser role in
wage dispersion by firm effects because the existing differences of market power amongst firms
were reduced.
14This goes against what was found for a region of Italy by Battisti (2013), where the contribution of the firm
effects declines significantly with the inclusion of the peer effect.
15Félix and Portugal (2016) identify the existence of search frictions (due to, for instance, imperfect information
on available jobs that would constitute an alternative), moving and learning costs, among others, as examples
of labor market failures.
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The variation of the peer effect has a small contribution to wage dispersion (between 0.5% and
1.4%). Matching between high skilled workers and highwage firms is also relevant, even though
in a smaller proportion than before (ranges between 4.6% and 7%). An additional impact is the
one of high skilled individuals sorting themselves into high quality peer groups, contributing
between 5.8% and 8% to wage inequality. This effect increased in the latest period, after a
continuous decline. The covariance between high wage firms and high quality peers contributes
between 0.8% and 2.8% to wage dispersion.
Comparing these outcomes with the ones on the full sample (see Table 4 in the appendix), person
effects are still the factor contributing more to wage dispersion, but in a smaller value than
in any of the periods, whilst only the first interval has a higher contribution of firm effects
than the correspondent value in the full model. Hence, splitting into periods is giving more
weight to person effects in detriment of firm effects. The contribution of the variation of person
effects is also smaller in the full model, while firm effects have a similar weight in both cases.
Positive assortative matching has a higher contribution in the full model (18%) than in any
interval.16 Relatively to the inclusion of the peer effect, a one standard deviation increase in
peer quality results in a wage increase of 3.91%, on average, ceteris paribus, which is somewhat
lower than what was noticed in the decomposition into periods. Battisti (2013) found this effect
to be of 7.81% for Veneto, Italy and Lengermann (2002) suggests this effect takes the value of
approximately 3% for the state of Illinois, United States of America. In Cornelissen, Dustmann,
and Schönberg (2013), small peer effects were also found for Germany. The authors advance
that this outcome likely derives from the prominent presence of occupations whereworkers don’t
observe the performance of their peers (which leads to a low peer pressure) and/or the lack of
high skilled and knowledge intensive jobs (which are the ones where knowledge spillovers are
more impactful). Relatively to the contribution of person effects to wage dispersion in this case,
it is only lower than the correspondent in the full model (49.21%) in the first period, whereas
for firm effects it is larger in the first two periods. In the full model, the contribution of the
peer effect is smaller in value than in any of the periods17. In the division into intervals, the
16As shown in Andrews et al. (2012), the estimation obtained for assortative matching in the division into intervals
may be downward biased due to less mobility of workers among firms.
17The contribution of the person effect variation is lower in the full model, with the exception of the first period;
the contribution of the variation of the peer effect is negligible in the full model.
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importance of positive assortative matching is much lower than in the full model, sorting of high
skilled workers into high quality peer groups has a much higher contribution to wage dispersion
and the covariance between high wage firms and high skilled peers is similar in both cases, only
with the latest interval presenting a smaller value.
6.1 Alternative specifications
When firm effects are time-varying (have firm-year fixed effects), the contribution of person
effects to the variance of wages suffers a slight decline in all intervals except in the last one
which observes a larger decrease, which is observable in Table 2.
Specification 1 Specification 2
Interval 1 Interval 2 Interval 3 Interval 4 Interval 1 Interval 2 Interval 3 Interval 4
(1986-1993) (1993-1999) (1999-2006) (2007-2013) (1986-1993) (1993-1999) (1999-2006) (2007-2013)
Var(yit) 0.306 0.346 0.340 0.311 0.298 0.337 0.331 0.302
Cov (yit, αi) 44.60% 48.07% 55.18% 57.47% 45.88% 49.96% 59.58% 68.33%
γCov (yit, α−i) 11.39% 7.66% 6.99% 7.43% 6.89% 5.27% 4.27% 5.87%
Cov (yit, θJ(i,t)) 23.58% 27.52% 26.23% 27.08% 29.49% 30.50% 25.41% 16.91%
Cov (p, yit) 1.16% 0.06% 0.26% 0.41%
Cov (yit, x
′
itβ) 12.99% 9.62% 5.73% 4.73% 7.89% 5.75% 3.51% 3.86%
Cov (yit, ϵit) 7.47% 7.13% 5.87% 3.29% 8.69% 8.45% 6.97% 4.62%
σ2(αi) 44.13% 45.02% 49.56% 50.73% 38.70% 43.86% 53.04% 61.36%
γ2σ2(α−i) 6.25% 2.68% 2.00% 2.10% 1.63% 1.00% 0.58% 0.93%
σ2(θJ(i,t)) 29.07% 27.09% 23.99% 24.74% 24.25% 26.85% 21.66% 15.02%
λ2σ2(p) 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
σ2(x
′
itβ) 11.53% 7.89% 4.19% 2.73% 5.57% 3.61% 2.10% 2.16%
2Cov(αi, θJ(i,t)) -10.17% -2.58% 1.61% 2.09% 4.64% 3.56% 5.13% 2.16%
2γCov (αi, α−i) 15.80% 10.47% 9.08% 9.52% 7.75% 6.91% 6.04% 9.07%
2λCov (αi, p) 0.77% 0.05% 0.27% 0.48%
2γCov (θJ(i,t), α−i) -6.95% -1.17% 0.62% 0.80% 2.15% 1.35% 1.16% 0.51%
2λγCov (p, α−i) 0.27% 0.01% 0.04% 0.09%
2λCov (θJ(i,t), p) 0.44% 0.05% 0.18% 0.21%
λ 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.005
γ 0.683 0.452 0.387 0.382 0.384 0.266 0.178 0.192
R2 0.925 0.929 0.941 0.967 0.913 0.916 0.930 0.954
Sample Size 7560726 9576699 11332464 12160252 6860216 8672027 10159088 11337389
Table 2: Alternative specifications of Equation (2)
Specification 1 corresponds to equation (2) but including time-varying firm effects whereas specification 2 corresponds to equation (3), which
differs from equation (2) due to the inclusion of a measure of productivity.
Firm effects are smaller in the first two periods, increasing in the remaining (especially so in the
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latest intervals). The contribution of the covariate index is larger in all periods, as is the peer
effect. The effect that a one standard deviation increase in the quality of the co-workers has on
wages is an increase of 13.84%, 9.63%, 8.25% and 8.09%, respectively, being much larger than
in the original case. This seems to struck a discordant note when compared with the opposite
finding in (Lengermann 2002). Actually, this result implies that firms that choose to increase the
quality of workforce are, at the same time, decreasing the wage premium paid to their workers. A
possible explanation for this is the increase in the supply of high skilled workers associated with
a decrease in wages (when is not matched by a demand increase), effect that is further enhanced
in the latest period due to a decline in labor demand caused by the economic crisis. In fact, if we
look at the mean of the peer effect (which measures the average quality of the workforce), from
the third to the fourth period there has been an increase of approximately 32% of the mean value
of this variable (refer to Table 3 in the appendix). Concerning the contribution of the variation
of each component, person effects are less variable, as well as firm effects. In this setting,
the contribution of the variation of the peer effect is larger than in the original setting (ranging
between 2% and 6%), in the first two periods negative assortative matching is observed and the
contribution of the covariance between the quality of the peer group and firm heterogeneity is
also negative. A major difference in this case is the large contribution of sorting of workers into
high skilled peer groups (ranging between 9.1% and 15.8%). Contrasting these conclusions with
the full model (Table 4 in the appendix), person effects have a lower contribution, as does the
peer effect. In the full model, the contribution of the firm effect goes to zero. Therefore, in this
specification for the full model, the contribution of firm effects is “given” to the other two effects,
which is not as observable in the division into time intervals18. The full model entails negative
assortative matching, much higher than in any interval, contrasting with the large contribution of
sorting of high skilled workers into high quality peers which is much larger than in any period. A
more relevant outcome is the increase of wages by 13.21% due to an increase of a one standard
deviation in the peer effect.
In including a measure of productivity, by estimating equation (6), an increase of a standard
18In the case of the contribution of the variation of person, peer and firm effects: they are much higher in the
full model (the same happens with the covariate index); in the first period it is higher than in the full model,
being much smaller in the remaining intervals; the full model shows a much lower effect than in any period;
respectively.
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deviation in the peer effect impacts wages slightly more than in the original case (6.97%, 5.82%,
4.38% and 5.30%, respectively). Considering the variance decompositions analysed, the results
are identical to the original model with the difference that the positive assortative matching is
lower. The contribution of productivity, its variation and the covariance between it and person
effects, peer effect and firm effects are rather muted. When comparing this formulation to the
full model specification, the same deductions of the comparison made in the context of equation
(2) hold. These conclusions likely result from the fact that the firm effect already absorbs any
impact productivity would have on wages.
7 Conclusion
The main purpose of this study was to investigate whether the quality of the group of co-workers
of an individual had an impact in the dispersion of inequality, observing how this contribution
would vary over time, along with other more common sources of variation like person and firm
characteristics. Additionally, it set out to verify if alternative specifications such as enabling firm
effects to vary over time and including productivity would change any of the aforementioned
effects. As found in previous empirical research, peer spillovers have a small, but relevant,
positive effect on the logarithm of real hourly wages. In this case, the contribution it has for
wage dispersion ranges from 4.3% to 6.6%, being slightly lower (approximately 4%) for the
full model. Nevertheless, if firm-year fixed effects are introduced, the values obtained are much
higher.
Decomposingwage dispersion into person, peers and firm components, person effects contribute
the most for wage dispersion, increasing its role in the course of time (from 45.6% to 68.5%),
while firm effects are also relevant but with a declining contribution (from 31.2% to 17.8%).
Although peer effects have a smaller contribution, they should not be dismissed, especially be-
cause its contribution increased in the latest period, after a smooth decline. Two other factors
impacting wage inequality besides the variation in person and firm effects are the covariance be-
tween these two effects or, putting it differently, sorting of high skilled workers into high wage
firms (contribute between 4.6% and 7%) and sorting of high skilled workers into high quality
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peer groups (the covariance between the person and peer effects contributes between 5.9% and
8% to wage dispersion). The mentioned effects do not suffer alterations when accounting for
different firm productivity levels, which likely results from the retention by the firm effect of any
impact this variable might have. However, when considering time-varying firm fixed effects,
the variation of person and firm effects present a more reduced contribution to the variance of
wages, being the contribution of the variation of the peer effect larger than in the original setting.
On balance, this thesis can be added to the recent literature on peer effects in the workplace,
particularly to their impact on wages and its dispersion. It contributes to the study of wage
dispersion in Portugal by complementing the existing knowledge of the period until the mid-
1990’s and extending it for more recent years.
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mean 0.157 -4.33E-12 -1.01E-12 -1.47E-10 0.157 -2.89E-12
st deviation 0.553 0.340 0.181 0.275 0.131 0.164
Interval 2 (1993-1999)
mean 0.332 -3.33E-12 -2.18E-12 5.86E-11 0.332 -2.90E-12
st deviation 0.588 0.385 0.217 0.302 0.112 0.171
Interval 3 (1999-2006)
mean 0.463 -3.11E-12 1.30E-12 -2.06E-10 0.463 1.56E-13
st deviation 0.583 0.423 0.251 0.265 0.085 0.154
Interval 4 (2007-2013)
mean 0.467 -3.37E-12 1.71E-12 2.04E-11 0.467 6.80E-13
st deviation 0.557 0.436 0.281 0.213 0.082 0.119
Interval 4 - Interval 3
mean 1% 8% 32% -110% 1% 336%
st deviation -4% 3% 12% -20% -4% -23%
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Concerns the variables included in the estimation of Equation (2)
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Full Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Var(yit) 0.340 0.340 0.340 0.331
Cov (yit, αi) 51.08% 49.21% 62.72% 49.13%
γCov (yit, α−i) 3.75% 13.11% 3.91%
Cov (yit, θJ(i,t)) 27.49% 25.42% 0.89% 24.16%
Cov (p, yit) 1.09%
Cov (yit, x
′
itβ) 9.38% 10.15% 12.24% 10.22%
Cov (yit, ϵit) 12.04% 11.48% 11.19% 11.50%
σ(αi) 41.02% 39.09% 64.21% 39.29%
σ(α−i) 0.45% 5.13% 0.50%




itβ) 7.63% 8.10% 17.37% 8.02%
Cov(αi, θJ(i,t)) 18.20% 14.06% -11.49% 12.40%
Cov (αi, α−i) 3.92% 20.56% 4.11%
Cov (αi, p) 0.89%
Cov (θJ(i,t), α−i) 2.38% -5.50% 2.27%
Cov (p, α−i) 0.15%
Cov (θJ(i,t), p) 0.78%
λ 0.013
γ 0.217 0.479 0.228
R2 0.885 0.885 0.887 0.885
Sample Size 37873532 37873532 37873532 34534575
Table 4: Variance Decomposition in the Full Model
Model (1) corresponds to the specification of equation (1), model (2) to the one of equation (2), model (3) to
the case with time-varying firm effects and model (4) to the specification that includes a measure of productivity.
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